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Abstract: I present three reasons why philosophers of science should be more concerned 
about violations of causal faithfulness (CF). In complex evolved systems, mechanisms 
for maintaining various equilibrium states are highly likely to violate CF. Even when 
such systems do not precisely violate CF, they may nevertheless generate precisely the 
same problems for inferring causal structure from probabilistic relationships in data as do 
genuine CF-violations. Thus, potential CF-violations are particularly germane to 
experimental science when we rely on probabilistic information to uncover the DAG, 
rather than already knowing the DAG from which we could predict the right experiments 
to ‘catch out’ the hidden causal relationships.  
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Several conditions must be met in order to apply contemporary causal modeling 
techniques to extract information about causal structure from probabilistic relationships 
in data. While there are slightly different ways of formalizing these requirements, three of 
the most important ones are the causal Markov, causal modularity, and causal faithfulness 
conditions. Potential failures of the first two of these conditions have already been the 
subject of discussion in philosophy of science (Cartwright 1999, 2002, 2006; Hausman 
and Woodward 1999, 2004; Steel 2006; Mitchell 2008; Woodward 2003, 2010). I will 
address failures in the third condition, causal faithfulness, and argue that failures of this 
condition are likely to occur in certain kinds of systems, especially those studied in 
biology, and are the most likely to cause trouble in experimental settings.  
Faithfulness is the assumption that there are no precisely counterbalanced causal 
relationships in the system that would result in a probabilistic independence between two 
variables that are actually causally connected. While faithfulness failures have been 
discussed primarily in the formal epistemology literature, I will argue that violations of 
faithfulness can impact experimental techniques, inferential license, and issues 
concerning scientific practice that are not exhausted by the formal epistemology 
literature. 
In particular, a formal methodological perspective might suggest a distinction 
between genuine and merely apparent failures of CF, such that supposed examples of CF-
violating systems are not ‘really’ CF-violating, but merely close. But as I will argue, this 
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distinction is not epistemically justifiable in experimental settings: we cannot distinguish 
between genuine and merely apparent CF violations unless we already know the 
underlying causal structure; without this information, merely apparent and genuine CF 
violations will be indistinguishable. Violations of CF faithfulness are particularly 
germane to experimental science, since CF is the assumption that takes us from 
probabilistic relationships among variables in the data to the underlying causal structure. 
In contrast, for instance, the Causal Markov condition takes us from causal structure to 
predicted probabilistic relationships. Going from data to underlying causal structure is the 
most common direction of inference from the epistemic vantage point of science. Rather 
than beginning by knowing the true causal graph of the system in question to predict 
probability distributions, experiment moves from probabilistic relationships to the 
underlying causal structure.  
This means that failures of CF arguably have the most potential for wreaking 
havoc in experimental settings, and have interesting methodological consequences for the 
practice of science: we should expect to find epistemic practices that compensate for CF-
violations in fields that study systems where faithfulness is likely to fail. Thus, these 
conditions are of interest not only to those working on formal modeling techniques, but 
also to broader discussions in philosophy of science, especially those that concern 
epistemic practices in the biological, cognitive, or medical sciences. 
 
2. Violations of the Causal Faithfulness Condition 
Violation of CF occurs when a system involves precisely counterbalanced causal 
relationships. These causal relationships appear “invisible” when information about 
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conditional and unconditional probabilities is used to ascertain a set of possible causal 
directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) that are consistent with data from that system. More 
precisely: 
 
Let G be a causal graph and P a probability distribution generated by G. <G, P> 
satisfies the Faithfulness Condition if and only if every conditional independence 
relation true in P is entailed by the Causal Markov Condition applied to G. (Spirtes, 
Glymour, and Scheines 2000, 31) 
 
One can think of faithfulness as the converse of the Causal Markov condition: 
faithfulness says that given a graph and associated probability distribution, the only 
independence relations are those that follow from the Causal Markov condition 
alone and not from special parameter values… (Woodward 2003, 65) 
 
Informally, variables should only be probabilistically independent if they are 
causally independent in the true causal graph; when causal relationships cancel each other 
out by having precisely counterbalanced parameter values, the variables are 
probabilistically independent, but not causally independent. Thus, in systems that have 
CF-violating causal relationships, the probabilistic relationships between variables 
include independencies that do not reflect the actual causal relationships between those 
variables.  
Probabilistic relationships are used to generate possible causal graphs for the 
system. There may be multiple distinct causal graphs which all imply the observed set of 
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probabilistic relationships. The candidate graphs can then be used to generate further 
interventions in the system that will distinguish between the graphs; if two candidate 
graphs make different predictions for the consequences of an intervention on variable A, 
then performing this intervention on A should return an answer as to which of the 
candidates graphs matches the observed results. The use of probabilistic data to generate 
candidate causal graphs that can then be used to suggest further interventions can save 
huge amounts of time and energy by focusing on a few likely candidates from an 
indefinitely large number of candidate causal structures. 
DAGs of causal faithfulness violations may take several forms. For example:  
 
Figure 1a      Figure 1b 
                         
 
Some authors (Pearl 2000, Woodward 2010) rely on a stronger constraint, causal 
stability, which requires that probabilistic independence relationships be stable under 
perturbation of parameter values across some range, to eliminate “pathological” (i.e. CF-
violating) parameter values.  
 
Definition 2.4.1 Stability:  
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Let I(P) denote the set of all conditional independence relationships embodies in P. 
A causal model M = <D, Θ> generates a stable distribution if and only if P(<D, 
Θ>) contains no extraneous independences – that is, if and only if I(P(<D, Θ>)) ⊆ 
I(P(<D, Θ`>)) for any set of parameters Θ`. (Pearl 2000) 
 
Violating causal stability would require a system to respond to changes in one parameter 
value with compensating changes in another parameter, so that the values remain exactly 
counterbalanced for some range of values.  
The potential for CF-violations to reduce the reliability of methods for extracting 
causal structure from data is well-known in formal epistemology. However, I will argue 
that philosophers of science in general should pay more attention to such violations; 
understanding the difficulties that CF-violations pose will enhance our ability to 
accurately characterize features of experimental practice, and should be included in 
normative considerations regarding evidence and inference. The main arguments in this 
paper can be summarized in three brief points: 
 
(1) Even if CF-violating systems are measure 0 with respect to the set of causal 
systems with randomly distributed parameter values, this does not imply that we 
will only encounter them with vanishing probability. CF-violating systems may be 
of particular interest for modeling purposes compared to non-CF-violating systems, 
in particular because certain kinds of systems may have structural features that 
render CF-violating parameter values more likely. 
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(2) As an example of point 1, structural considerations regarding dynamically 
stable systems that are the result of evolutionary processes should lead us to expect 
CF-violations in various biological systems. For systems that have evolved to 
maintain stable equilibrium states against external perturbation, we should also 
expect violations of the stronger condition, causal stability. I briefly present an 
example of this: mechanisms for salinity resistance in estuary nudibranchs. 
 
(3) ‘Apparent’ CF-violations in equilibrium-maintaining systems can be generated 
in certain experimental conditions even though the actual causal relationships in 
question may not be exactly balanced. Some measurement circumstances will result 
in a data set that violates CF, even if the actual system being measured does not 
genuinely violate CF. We should be as concerned with merely apparent as with 
genuine CF-violations, since both kinds of violations lead to the same difficulties 
for moving from probabilistic relationships in data to accurate DAGs of systems.  
 
These three points highlight why philosophers of science in general should be concerned: 
causal systems may not genuinely violate CF, but yet pose the same problems for 
experimental investigations as if they did. Apparent CF-violations occur when systems do 
not in principle violate CF but appear to due to measurement issues connected with data-
gathering. In both genuine and merely apparent CF-violations, probabilistic relationships 
in the data will suggest a set of candidate causal graphs that are inaccurate; as a result, 
further interventions will yield conflicting answers. Scientists could in principle ‘catch 
out’ these merely apparent CF-violations if they knew exactly how to test for them. But to 
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do this, they would need the DAG, and this is the information that they lack when 
proceeding from the data to underlying causal structure. When we have incomplete 
knowledge of the causal structure of the system under investigation, we lack this ability 
to distinguish between merely apparent and genuine CF-violations. Both raise the same 
problems. 
 
3. The measure of CF-violating systems 
Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (2000) offer a proof that CF-violating systems are 
Lebesgue measure 0 with respect to possible causal systems, while non-CF-violating 
systems are measure 1. “The parameter values—values of the linear coefficients and 
exogenous variances of a structure—form a real space, and the set of points in this space 
that create vanishing partial correlations not implied by the Markov condition have 
Lebesgue measure 0” (41). From this, they conclude that we are vanishingly unlikely to 
encounter CF-violating systems, and so proceed on the initial presumption that any given 
causal system is not CF-violating. This proof may be part of the reason why 
comparatively little attention has been paid to causal faithfulness compared to the causal 
Markov and modularity conditions. However, the fact that CF-violating systems are 
measure 0 in this class does not imply that we will not encounter them with any 
frequency.  
To motivate this, consider an analogy with rational numbers. They are also 
measure 0 with respect to the real numbers, while irrational numbers are measure 1. And, 
there are circumstances under which we are vanishingly unlikely to find them. If a 
random real number were to be chosen from the number line, the probability that we will 
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draw an irrational number is so overwhelming as to warrant ignoring the presence of 
rational numbers. However, this does not imply that rational numbers are unlikely to be 
encountered simpliciter: bluntly put, we don’t ‘encounter’ the numbers by randomly 
drawing them from the number line. Rational numbers are encountered overwhelmingly 
more often than one would expect from considering only the proof that they are measure 
0 with respect to real numbers. 
The Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines proof assumes that all parameter values 
within the range of a continuous variable are equally probable (Zhang and Spirtes 2008). 
Without this assumption, one can’t presume that the CF-violating values are vanishingly 
unlikely. For instance, this assumption does not hold for systems that involve 
equilibrium-maintaining causal mechanisms. Such mechanisms work to maintain 
counterbalanced parameter values, rendering it much more likely that parameter values 
will result in CF-violations.  
It is true that if causal systems took on parameter values randomly from their 
range, we would expect to encounter CF-violating systems with vanishingly small 
probability, and in that scenario, we could safely ignore CF-violations as a real possibility 
on any given occasion. However, some systems survive, and become scientifically 
interesting targets for investigation, precisely because they achieve long-term dynamic 
equilibrium using mechanisms that rely on balanced parameter values. In such systems, 
the parameter values are most certainly not indifferently probable over their range. In 
fields like biology, neuroscience, medicine, etc., we are disproportionately interested in 
modeling systems that involve equilibrium maintaining mechanisms. This suggests that 
our modeling interests are focused on CF-violating systems in a way that is 
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disproportionate to their measure when considered against all possible causal systems. 
Thus, we cannot conclude from the fact that CF-violating parameter values have measure 
0 with respect to all possible parameter values that we will not encounter such violations 
on a regular basis. 
Zhang and Spirtes (2008) discuss some circumstances in which systems may 
violate CF. However, their discussion makes it seem like CF-violations occur primarily in 
artificial or constructed circumstances. One such example is homeostatic systems, which 
maintain equilibrium against some range of perturbations, such as thermostats 
maintaining a constant temperature in a room. Zhang and Spirtes demonstrate that CF can 
be replaced with two distinct subconditions, that, taken together, provide almost the same 
inferential power as causal faithfulness. If systems violate only one of these 
subconditions, such violations can be empirically detected. This is an extremely useful 
result, and increases the power of Bayes’ nets modeling to recover DAGs from data. 
However, this result should not be taken as resolving the problem.  
In particular, their use of a thermostat as example of a homeostatic system does 
not do justice to the incredibly complex mechanisms for homeostasis that can be found in 
various biological systems. Considering these more sophisticated examples provides a 
clearer view of the potential problems involved in modeling such systems under the 
assumption of causal faithfulness.  
 
4. Evolved dynamical systems and equilibrium-maintaining mechanisms 
The tendency for evolved systems like populations, individual organisms, 
ecosystems, and the brain to involve precisely balanced causal relationships can be easily 
	   11	  
explained by the role these balanced relationships play in maintaining various 
equilibrium states (see, for instance, Mitchell 2003, 2008). Furthermore, the mechanisms 
by which organisms maintain internal equilibrium with respect to a huge variety of states 
will need to be flexible. They need to not simply maintain a static equilibrium, but 
respond to perturbation from the outside by maintaining that equilibrium. This means that 
many mechanisms for equilibrium maintenance will have evolved to keep an internal 
state fixed over some range of values in other variables, not merely for a single precise 
set of values. Any system that survives because of its capacity to maintain stability in the 
face of changing causal parameters or variable values will be disproportionately likely to 
display CF-violating causal relationships, and, more strongly also violate causal stability. 
An intriguing example is nudibranchs, commonly known as sea slugs (see 
especially Berger and Kharazova 1997). Many nudibranchs live in ecosystems such as 
reefs, where salinity levels in the water change very little. These nudibranchs are 
stenohaline: able to survive within a narrow range of salinity changes only. In cases 
where salinity levels vary over narrow ranges, nudibranchs respond to changes in salinity 
levels by a cellular mechanism for osmoregulation, where cells excrete sodium ions or 
take in water through changes in cell ion content and volume. This mechanism provides 
tolerance, but not resistance, to salinity changes, because it maintains equilibrium by 
exchanging ions and water with the surrounding environment. In cases of extremely high 
or low salinity, this mechanism will cause the animal to extrude too much or take in too 
much (this is why terrestrial slugs die when sprinkled with salt). 
Euryhaline nudibranchs, found in estuary environments where saline levels may 
vary dramatically between tides and over the course of a season or year, display a much 
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higher level of resistance to salinity changes. There is a pay-off, in the form of increased 
food sources with reduced competition for nudibranchs that are able to withstand the 
changing saline levels. But in these environments, the osmoregulatory mechanism for 
salinity tolerance is insufficient. A further mechanism has evolved in nudibranchs (and in 
molluscs more generally) for salinity resistance in conditions of extreme salinity 
variations in the external environment. These two mechanisms for salinity regulation in 
euryhaline nudibranchs are fairly independent. The osmoregulation mechanism is 
supplemented with an additional mechanism which involves hermeticization of the 
mantle, which prevents water and ion exchange with the outside environment.. This can 
accommodate changes in salinity that take place over fairly short periods of time, since 
salinity levels can change dramatically over the course of an hour. Instead of maintaining 
blood salinity at the same level as the outside environment, this additional mechanism 
allows the organism to maintain an internal salinity level that differs from that of its 
environment. Mantle hermeticization and osmoregulation are distinct mechanisms, but in 
contexts of extremely high or low salinity, they will both act such that the variables of 
external and internal salinity are independent 
Further, there are two distinct mechanisms in muscle cells that work in coordination 
in extreme salinity cases to maintain a balance of ions inside the muscle cell. The 
concentration of these ions, especially sodium and potassium, can change dramatically in 
low or high salinity levels. There are two ion pumps in the cell that maintain overall ion 
concentration at equilibrium across a fairly substantial range of salinity variation in the 
external environment. Even though external salinity has several causal effects on the 
internal ion balance of a cell, these two variables will be probabilistically independent for 
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a range of external salinity values (in particular, for the range in which the organisms are 
naturally found). 
 
The ion balance of muscle cells during adaptation to various salinities could not be 
achieved by virtue of the Na/K-pump alone, removing sodium and accumulating 
potassium. As it is clear from the data obtained, the concentration of both ions 
drops at low salinity and increases at high salinity. Therefore, the effective ion 
regulation in molluscan cells can be provided only by cooperative action of two 
pumps – the Na/K-pump and Na,Cl-pump, independent of potassium transport. 
(Berger and Karazova 1997, 123-4) 
 
There are several points that this example illustrates. The first is that of the 
comparative probability that a complex system, such as an organism like a nudibranch, 
will display CF-violating causal relationships in the form of mechanisms that maintain 
equilibrium. Consider the (Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 2000) proof that assumes that 
all parameter values are equally likely. We can see how this falls apart in the case of 
evolved systems. Let’s grant that, in some imaginary past history, all the parameter 
values for mechanisms such as these two ion pumps were equally likely. This would have 
resulted in a vast number of organisms that ended up very rapidly with internal ion 
imbalances and then (probably rather immediately) died. The organisms that managed to 
stick around long enough to leave offspring were, disproportionately, those with 
mechanisms that were precisely counterbalanced to maintain this internal equilibrium. 
Having CF-violating mechanisms would be a distinct advantage. The same applies for 
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other important equilibrium states –organisms with less closely matched values are less 
capable of maintaining that equilibrium state. Insofar as these are important states to 
maintain, it becomes extremely probable that. Over time, those with the closest matches 
for parameter values will be more likely to survive. Thus, even if we grant the 
assumption (already unlikely in this context) that all parameter values start out as equally 
likely, we can see how rapidly the CF-violating ones would come to be vastly 
overrepresented in the population. 
The second point it illustrates is how such sophisticated equilibrium-maintaining 
mechanisms can violate CF in a much more problematic way than the comparatively 
simplistic thermostat example considered by Zhang and Spirtes.1 Finally, note that the 
two ion pump mechanisms are not balanced merely for a single external salinity value: 
they are balanced for a range of values. Thus, this example violates not merely CF but 
also the stronger condition of causal stability.2 
I am certainly not claiming that all causal relationships in such systems will 
violate CF or causal stability. But it is possible that, for any given system that involves 
equilibrium-maintaining mechanisms, and especially for those with sophisticated evolved 
equilibrium-maintaining mechanisms, there will be at least some causal relationships in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Note	  that	  a	  DAG	  representing	  the	  two	  mechanisms	  for	  the	  ion	  pumps,	  connecting	  external	  salinity	  levels	  as	  a	  variable	  to	  a	  variable	  representing	  internal	  ion	  balance	  in	  muscle	  cells,	  is	  not	  of	  the	  triangular	  form	  that	  is	  potentially	  detectable	  using	  the	  methods	  in	  Zhang	  and	  Spirtes	  (2008).	  2	  This	  example	  also	  provides	  weight	  to	  the	  Russo-­‐Williamson	  thesis,	  that	  information	  about	  probabilistic	  relationships	  requires	  supplementation	  with	  information	  about	  underlying	  mechanisms	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  causal	  claims.	  These	  examples	  suggest	  how	  investigation	  into	  mechanisms	  for	  equilibrium-­‐maintenance	  compensate	  for	  the	  methodological	  issues	  that	  CF	  violations	  generate;	  we	  would	  expect	  the	  Russo-­‐Williamson	  thesis	  to	  hold	  particularly	  of	  systems	  liable	  to	  violate	  CF.	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the system that violate either or both of these conditions. This changes the stance we take 
at the beginning of an investigation: rather than starting from the assumption that CF-
violations are vanishingly unlikely, and only revisiting this assumption in the face of 
difficulties, we should start investigations of such systems with the assumption that it is 
highly likely that there will be at least one such spurious probabilistic independence. 
 
5. Apparent CF-violations and their experimental consequences 
Consider a possible response to the argument in the previous section. One might 
be concerned that the examples I offer do not involve genuine CF-violations–when 
examined more closely, it may turn out that the causal relationships in questions are not 
exactly balanced, but merely close. This response might involve the claim that even in the 
case of biological systems, CF is not genuinely violated, because there are slight 
differences in parameter values that could be identified, especially if one performed the 
right interventions on the systems to ‘catch out’ the slight mismatch in parameter values. 
Or, by taking recourse to causal stability, one might say that while the equilibrium state 
of some systems involves precisely counterbalanced causal relationships, in the case of 
perturbation to that equilibrium, these relationships will be revealed. Perturbation of 
systems that return to equilibrium would thus be a strategy for eliminating many (or 
most) merely apparent CF-violations. 
Answering this challenge brings us to the heart of why CF-violations deserve 
broader discussion. Considered from a formal perspective, there is a deep and important 
difference between systems that actually violate CF, or causal stability, and those that do 
not. This fact motivates a response to merely apparent CF-violations that takes them to be 
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not methodologically problematic in the same way that genuine ones are. But the ways in 
which merely apparent CF-violations can be ‘caught out’ generally will require 
information about the DAG for the system, in order to predict precisely which variables 
should be intervened on, within what parameter ranges, in order to uncover closely-but-
not-exactly matched parameter values. While it is in principle possible to do this, it 
requires knowing precisely which intervention to perform, and it is this information that 
will be lacking in a large number of experimental situations where we don’t already have 
the DAG for the system, since that is what we are trying to find. 
Thus, a particular data set drawn from a target system for which investigators are 
seeking the DAG may have spurious conditional independencies between variables (i.e. 
violate CF) even though in the true DAG, those parameters are not precisely balanced. In 
other words, depending on how the data is obtained from the system, the data set may 
violate CF even though the system itself doesn’t. How could this happen? There are a 
soberingly large number of ways in which a data set can be generated such that a merely 
apparent CF-violation occurs. The point to note here is that merely apparent violations 
will cause exactly the same problems for researchers as would genuine CF-violations. 
There are methodological issues in dynamically complex systems such that a non-CF-
violating system may nevertheless result in a dataset that is CF-violating. Here are some 
ways in which this may happen. 
The first is quite obvious: parameter values that are not exactly opposite may 
nevertheless be close enough that their true values differ by less than the margin of error 
on the measurements. Consider the parameter values in diagram 1a. A genuine CF-
violation will occur if a=-bc. However, an apparent CF-violation will occur if a±ε1=-
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bc±ε2. Concerns about the precision of measurements and error ranges are well-known, 
but it is useful to consider them here with respect to the issue of causal faithfulness as 
another way to flesh out their role in investigatory practices. 
Two other ways in which apparent CF-violations may occur concern temporal 
factors which may play a key role in the ‘catching’ of equilibrium-balanced causal 
relationships. Temporal factors can distinguish systems with or without causal stability, 
for instance, a CF-violating system that is fragilely balanced.  
Consider the time scale of a system that involves balanced causal relationships for the 
purposes of restoring and maintaining some equilibrium state: this may be on the order of 
milliseconds for some cellular processes, tens to hundreds of milliseconds for many 
neurological processes, minutes to days for individual organisms. After a perturbation 
takes place, the system will re-establish equilibrium during that range of time. In order to 
successfully ‘catch’ the counterbalanced causal relationships in the act of re-
equilibrating, the time scale of the measurements must be on a similar or shorter time 
scale. If the time scale of measurements is long with respect to the time scale for re-
establishing equilibrium, these balanced causal relationships will not be caught.  
This basic point about taking state change data from dynamic processes has 
particular implications for CF-violations. For processes that re-equilibrate after 50 ms, for 
instance, a measurement device that samples the process at higher time scales, such as 
500ms, will miss the re-equilibration. Thus, even though the system does not violate 
causal stability, it will behave as if it does, as it will appear that there is a conditional 
independence between two variables across some range of values, namely, the range 
between the initial state and the state to which the system was perturbed. In particular, if 
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we do not know what the time scale is, or is likely to be, for re-equilibration, we cannot 
ensure that a persisting probabilistic independence between two variables in question is 
genuine or a consequence of an overly fast re-equilibration timescale. 
Not only does comparative time scales matter for apparent CF-violations; there 
are also possibilities for phase-matched cycles that that will make a non-CF-violating 
oscillating system appear to violate CF. Some systems develop equilibrium mechanisms 
that result in slight oscillations above and below a target state. If the measurements from 
this system are taken with a frequency that closely matches that of the rate of oscillation, 
then the measurements will pick out the same positions in the cycle, essentially rendering 
the oscillation invisible. This would constitute an apparent CF-violation as well. 
Predicting possible CF-violations, real or apparent, requires information about the 
dynamic and evolved complexity of the systems in question, the particular equilibrium 
states they display, the time scale for re-establishment of equilibrium compared with the 
time scale of measurement, and/or the cycle length for cyclical processes. 
 
6. Conclusion 
To summarize briefly: some kinds of systems, especially those studied in the so-
called ‘special sciences’, are likely to display the kinds of structural features that lead to 
CF-violations, such as mechanisms for equilibrium maintenance across a range of 
variable values. Some systems that do not have CF-violating DAGs may nevertheless 
generate CF-violating data sets. When we are considering the inferences made from 
probabilistic relationships in data to a DAG for the underlying system, and do not already 
have the DAG in hand, we cannot distinguish between genuine and merely apparent CF-
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violations; both will cause the same epistemic difficulties for scientists, which is why 
merely apparent CF-violations deserve broader attention. 
It’s important to note that I am not discounting the extraordinary achievements in 
formal epistemology and causal modeling that have marked the last two decades of 
research on this topic. The steps forward in this field have been monumental, including 
the development of methods by which to reduce some of the issues arising from CF-
violations (such as Zhang and Spirtes 2008). Rather, my goal is to clarify the ways in 
which apparent CF-violations can arise, the kinds of structural features a system might 
display that would increase the likelihood of CF-violation, and to bring this issue from 
discussion in formal epistemology into consideration of scientific practice more broadly. 
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